



Capital and Regulatory Requirements for Captive Insurers: a Western Hemisphere Perspective

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Quick captives overview

- A captive is a special purpose insurance company formed primarily to write the risks of its parent or third party risks that are somehow affiliated with the parent
- May be organized under the domicile's regular insurance laws – or not
- Usually regulation is more limited in exchange for limitation on what risks the captive may write

Quick captives overview

- In its simplest form: a “pure” captive
 - Corporation with one or more subsidiaries sets up an insurance subsidiary – the captive
 - Domiciled and capitalized in a jurisdiction that allows for captive insurance companies
 - Captive underwrites risks of its parent and/or sister companies: collects premiums, pays claims, earns investment income on its capital and reserves

Why go to all the trouble?

- Unavailability of coverage
- Coverage that is too expensive
- Coverage doesn't meet the insured's needs
- Premium rates that don't reflect the insured's risk profile
- Inflexible policies or terms
- Taxes: it's always about taxes

Pure captives

- At its core, a pure captive is a risk financing vehicle
 - More risk management control than traditional insurance can lead to lower total losses
 - More financial control, but little if any transfer of risk away from the corporation
 - Avoids paying a carrier to trade \$\$
 - Can create significant earnings volatility
 - Custom-tailored coverages allow for financing of otherwise uninsured risks

Western hemisphere domiciles: offshore

- Bermuda
 - Oldest and most sophisticated
 - Excellent captive administration industry
 - Favorite domicile for multi-nationals with complicated risk profiles
- Cayman Islands and Barbados
 - Some regulatory arbitrage: lower initial capital requirements than Bermuda, less regulation
- Solvency II not expected to affect single parent captives
- US tax advantage for offshore captives is almost entirely gone

Western hemisphere domiciles: domestic

- Canadian provinces (principally British Columbia)
 - Favorable tax treatment for Canadian risks
 - Allows Canadian parent to write some statutory covers
- US States
 - 20+ have captive legislation; significant competition among the States
 - Capital requirements
 - Legal forms allowed
 - Premium taxes
 - Regulatory atmosphere
 - Almost exclusively US risks

Single parent captives: capitalization

- Objective: risk financing for exposures that would otherwise be retained
- Corporate risk appetite and captive risk appetite may not be the same
 - Parent should have more than sufficient financial solidity to retain the risk
 - Captive regulatory structure requires capital *within the captive* to support the risk
 - Creates a natural tension: should the captive carry more than the minimum when the parent could always infuse more capital (or shut the captive down and retain the risk)?
 - Likely that asset returns in the captive are minimal

Single parent captives: capitalization

- Most US-based single parent captives are relatively thinly capitalized
 - *However*, must be sufficiently capitalized that there is risk transfer: if almost any adverse experience will exceed the capital, then the US Internal Rev Service will not allow reserves to be deducted on income taxes
 - *Frequently* targeted at the 90% to 95% outcome for losses with no provision for operational risk and possibly none for asset risk (although assets tend to be very conservatively invested)
 - I have seen at least one example where a corporation chose to do a loss portfolio transfer from its statutory insurance subsidiary to a captive precisely to avoid US risk based capital requirements

Exception: Canadian multi-nationals

- Canada imposes a significant tax on repatriated profits
 - Strong incentive to keep money out of Canada as long as possible
- Island captives (Bermuda, Barbados, Cayman)
 - Write non-Canadian exposures and some Canadian at a profit and build surplus
 - Rates must be competitively justified: market competitive or experience-based
 - Surplus must be supported by insurance risk

Canadian multi-nationals

- Typical exposures written
 - Anything US-based: auto, other liability, workers compensation, health
 - Sometimes reinsuring a US-domiciled captive
 - Canadian and worldwide property and liability
 - Often for high limits and at high attachments
 - More esoteric risks: trade credit, business interruption, marine cargo, key man life, product recall

Canadian multi-nationals: capital modeling

- Risk appetite in business practices is relatively high
 - Hard to quantify exposures
 - High attachments and limits
- Target: maximize justifiable asset retention
 - Build reserves for longer term exposures (such as US workers compensation)
 - Select a high surplus target (e.g. 99.995% of modeled outcomes)
 - Include a provision for operational risk

Straying a bit off target: What can go wrong?

- Canadian multi-national in oil & gas exploration with worldwide exposures
- Bermuda captive writes property & nat cat cover on all locations (without much consultation with the business units)
 - Objective is to finance future property losses, manage tracking of exposures
 - Smooths earnings for operating units compared to self-insurance
 - Market competitive rates adjusted for lower expense/profit ratios than in the commercial market
 - E.g. about C\$2,000,000 for C\$100,000,000 limits

Straying a bit off target: What can go wrong?

- C\$100,000,000 loss in the UK
- Risk manager initially delighted to report that there is coverage, Bermuda will pay the loss in full, everyone should agree this is a risk management win
- Except it's not. UK's petroleum revenue tax is 81%, and it's ring-fenced from offsets by other corporate losses

Straying a bit off target: What can go wrong?

- Without the captive insurance, UK subsidiary would have had a C\$100,000,000 loss, and consolidated corporate would show C\$100,000,000 loss
- With the captive insurance, expectation was that UK subsidiary would have an expense of \$C2,000,000 and Bermuda a net loss of C\$98,000,000: no change to consolidated corporate, but better financing and risk management

Straying a bit off target: What can go wrong?

- Actual result:
 - Captive has a C\$98,000,000 loss
 - UK unit has a C\$2,000,000 expense and a C\$100,000,000 recovery, so a net C\$98,000,000 increase in the UK unit's profits, taxed at 81% = C\$79,380,000
 - So on a consolidated basis, the corporation not only paid the C\$100,000,000 loss, it also paid C\$79,380,000 in taxes on the loss
- Surprisingly, the risk manager did not lose his job

Some other types of captives

- Multiple owner or association captives
 - Formed by unrelated companies that have some tie other than the captive – such as in the same industry
 - Some function as a mutual insurer: all of the insureds may also be owners
 - US federal risk retention group legislation takes some of the regulation away from the States.

Risk retention groups

- Formed by unrelated entities in the same industry to share risk
 - Created during the 1980's liability insurance crisis when commercial coverage was simply not available
 - Not subject to State regulation but also not covered by State guarantee funds
- Effectively lightly-regulated mutual insurers
 - Subject to NAIC RBC requirements
- Pitfalls: all of the member/owners need to have a common objective to stay for the long haul
 - Can be very hard to sustain during a prolonged soft market
 - “We can always identify another stupid insurer”
- Individual capital accounts: available for all when needed, but what to do when a large member chooses to leave and wants to withdraw its capital?

Some other types of captives

- Profit sharing captives formed by insurance agents
 - Agency captives: reinsures part of the risk written by a licensed carrier through the agency. Allows agency to share in the profits (sometimes the losses as well)
 - Association captives or risk retention groups formed and managed through the agency. Usually a really good deal for the agency.

Risk retention groups and insurance agents

- There is a natural conflict of interest
 - Agency expects to receive compensation to manage the captive as well as commissions on the premiums
 - Agency owner understands the risk far better than the insureds (although probably not as well as he thinks he does)
 - Risk retention groups can offer tailored coverages, often at very competitive rates
 - But RRGs are outside the State insurance guarantee fund – so policyholders are taking on the insolvency risk

Some other types of captives

- Micro captives: formed by very small corporations or individuals to take advantage of favorable insurance taxation
- Wealth transfer captives: formed by the heirs of a closely-held corporation to write its risks - transferring wealth to the heirs via profits

Wealth transfer captive example: how much surplus is enough?

- Closely held corporation that would normally retain substantial risk
 - Currently owned by the company founder's daughters and managed by three of the five grandchildren
- Operating units purchase ground up coverage from ABC insurance company, an offshore captive owned by all of the grandchildren
 - Rates targeted to cover losses at the 65th percentile of the loss distribution (a healthy risk margin)
 - Rates are substantially lower than the commercial market, but higher than the cost would be to the operating units to just retain the risk
 - So the risk retention savings are shared between the operating units and the grandchildren

Wealth transfer captive example: how much capital is enough?

- ABC started with \$100,000 in capital and has grown over 25 years to \$300 million in assets including about \$150 million in surplus
 - Board believes that there is room for dividends to be paid, and asked us to help develop a dividend policy.
 - The captive has been paying experience dividends
 - Based on Board consensus, but not grounded in any particular policy

Surplus

- Like all insurance companies, ABC carries surplus to cover the risk of losses
 - Underwriting results worse than the premiums or the carried reserves
 - Adverse investment results
 - Other types of losses

How much surplus is enough?

- Depends on the Company's risk appetite:
 - What probability of insolvency is appropriate to the Company's business plan?
 - This is ultimately a decision that can only be made by the Board
- Examples share with the Board
 - Solvency II baseline: probability of ruin in the next 12 months is less than 0.5% (the 99.5%ile)
 - Rating Agencies set approximate expected capital levels to go with their various ratings:
 - BBB about 99.75%, A 99.94%, AA 99.99%
 - AAA at 99.995%

How much surplus is enough?

- *Only the Board of Directors can make this decision*
- Prior discussions told us the ABC Board is *very* risk averse
 - We assumed a target surplus at the AAA rating level
 - Probability of insolvency at 0.005%, or one in 20,000
 - This was the economic capital target selected by the Board after consultation
- Anything extra is “free capital”
 - You can do other things with this – including dividends

ABC's Risk Exposures

- Underwriting Risk
 - Premiums and Reserves are conservative, but there is still the potential for adverse results
 - We model this consistent with our other actuarial work
- Asset Risk (market risk)
 - ABC's investments are significantly more aggressive than the typical insurer asset mix
 - Significantly offset by a widely diverse portfolio, but assets tend to move together especially at the extremes
 - Uncomplicated modeling based on modeled interest rates and equity returns


ABC's Risk Exposures

- Operational Risk
 - Risk of loss due to people, process or systems, and outside event risk
 - Includes errors, natural disasters, fraud, etc.
 - Very, very hard to measure, but surplus should include a provision for this risk (a gross up to the modeling)
 - We include a provision for these risks based on a percentage of revenue
 - Probably way overstates the actual exposure for ABC


Other Risk Exposures

- Credit Risk (risk of bond default)
 - To some extent, this is included in the provision for market risk
 - We have not included an explicit provision in the surplus calculations because of the diversification in ABC's portfolio
- Liquidity Risk
 - Due to the very long nature of ABC's obligations and the relative liquidity of the assets, we have not considered this risk to be material

Breakdown of Assets before Diversification




Breakdown of Assets after Diversification



Economic and Free Capital

- Economic Capital (on top of reserves at the 65th percentile) = \$97,000,000
- Free Capital = \$44,000,000
 - Potential uses within the Company: e.g. expand the underwriting portfolio, invest in different assets, or other ventures
 - Outside the Company: draw down the free capital over a short or long period of time and allow the owners to use as they see fit (e.g. through dividends)

One Year Surplus Range of Outcomes



Using Free Capital within the Captive

- Expanding the underwriting portfolio: Which choices make sense?
- Internal benchmark is the expected underwriting return on economic capital
 - Takes both riskiness of the business and risk appetite of the company into consideration
 - Without penalizing lines of business for free capital

Using Free Capital within the Captive

- New exposures should meet the same expected return on economic cap hurdle
 - Higher limits or new lines of business
- Economic capital required for new business set at risk appetite percentile
 - Usually ignores diversification benefit, but could be incorporated
 - But: Don't assign all of the diversification benefit to the new exposure!

Using free capital inside/outside the captive

- Ultimately, ABC's Board elected to use the free capital to finance sale of ABC to the next generation



Thank you for inviting me to join you
today

Discussion!

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